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Resetting the Foundations:
Renewing Freedom of Expression under Section s.2(b) of the Charter
(forthcoming winter 2022, Supreme Court Law Review)
Jamie Cameron*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The 40th anniversary of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on April 17, 2022
is a time for reckoning, and an opportunity to ready s.2’s fundamental freedoms for the future.1
Today, as ever, freedom is under perennial challenge from the collective instinct to suppress voices
and views that threaten to upset the status quo. The fundamental freedoms of religion, expression,
peaceful assembly, and association are subject to the benevolence of the dominant will, and to any
constraints the Charter’s system of constitutional rights might place on that will.2 Whether and to
what degree a democratic community accepts freedom of difference, including differences that
may be volatile and even destabilizing, is an age-old question. That much is familiar.
This discussion on the freedom to differ and dissent focuses on s.2(b)’s guarantee of
expressive freedom. If s.2(b)’s fortunes in the Charter’s formative period were mixed, two
catalysts propel a re-set of the guarantee’s foundations at this time. First is a backdrop of rising
concern and pushback against the perceived excesses of expressive freedom, and a sensibility, in

* Professor Emerita, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I thank the co-chairs of the Forgotten Foundations
Workshop, Brian Bird and Derek Ross, for inviting me to participate in the Workshop, and also for providing
valuable comments and editorial assistance on earlier drafts of my paper. I also thank Hoi Kong for commenting on
the Workshop draft and engaging with me in discussion at the symposium. Finally, I am grateful to Matthew
Traister (J.D. 2023) for his valuable research, especially on the “legacy” jurisprudence, discussed infra.
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11 (“the Charter”).
2

Note that section 33 of the Charter grants legislatures the power to override certain Charter rights and freedoms,
namely s. 2 and sections 7 to 15 for a period of five years. In recent years the override has been invoked in
controversial circumstances in Quebec, Saskatchewan, and Ontario. See e.g., Bill 21, An Act respecting the laicity of
the State, 1st Sess., 42d Leg., Quebec, 2019 (S.Q. 2019, c.12) and An Act respecting French, the official and common
language of Quebec, 1st Sess., 42d Leg., Quebec, 2021) (Quebec); The School Protection Act, S.S. 2018, c. 39
(Saskatchewan); and Bill 307, The Protecting Elections and Defending Democracy Act, 2021, S.O. 2021, c.31
(Ontario).
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some discourse, that free expression is a throwback value, laissez-faire and regressive in nature. 3
To some extent, that views finds expression in a regulatory impetus that aims primarily, though
not exclusively, at online communications.4
Technology has shifted and escalated debate about the boundaries of expressive freedom,
and while the regulatory thrust varies in its details, controlling a flood of unfathomable online
content is the overarching goal. Regulating technology adds a layer of complication, but does not
alter the unrelenting goal of eliminating objectionable content. While the abuse of freedom must
be countered, expressive content is too often restricted through clumsy and overbroad measures
that rest on an expansive and amorphous concept of harm. In conceptual terms, it is troubling that
limits on expression may not be presented as exceptions to a presumption in freedom’s favour.
Too often, suppression is grounded in righteous conviction that prohibiting content that offends
and even hurts is unarguable.
A second imperative arising from this synergy concerns s.2(b)’s doctrinal edifice and its
lack of fortitude to withstand the pressures of the day. To be fair, some branches of s.2(b)

3

In the United States, see, e.g., G. Lakier, “The Non-First Amendment Law of Freedom of Speech”, 134 Harv. L.
Rev. 2299 (2021) (explaining how the “non First-Amendment” system of speech laws exemplify a majoritarian free
speech tradition and modify the “laissez faire” constitutionalism of the First Amendment); T. Wu, “Is the First
Amendment Obsolete?”, 117 Mich. L. Rev, 547 (explaining that many of the core assumptions of the First
Amendment no longer hold true); P.E. Moskowitz, The Case Against Free Speech: The First Amendment, Fascism
and the Future of Dissent (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2019 (maintaining that freedom of speech has never
existed and is empty, hollow, and meaningless). In Canada, see, e.g., R. Moon, “Does Freedom of Expression Have
a Future”?, in E. Macfarlane, ed., Dilemmas of Free Expression (U. of Toronto Press, fall 2021), at 15-34
(“Dilemmas”).
4 See, e.g., Report of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, House of Commons, Taking Action to
End Online Hate (June 2019, 42nd Parlt), online:
https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/JUST/Reports/RP10581008/justrp29/justrp29-e.pdf; Final
Report, Canadian Commission on Democratic Expression, “Harms Reduction: A Six-Step Program to Protect
Democratic Expression Online (January 2021)(“A Six-Step Program”), online: https://ppforum.ca/articles/harmsreduction-a-six-step-program-to-protect-democratic-expression-online/; Bill C-36, An Act to amend the Criminal
Code and the Canadian Human Rights Act (hate propaganda, hate crimes and hate speech), (1st Reading, June 23,
2021), online: https://parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/43-2/bill/C-36/first-reading
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jurisprudence, such as the open court doctrine, are for the most part exemplary. 5 Moreover, and
despite refusing to grant it constitutional recognition, the Court’s jurisprudence acknowledges the
distinctive role the press and media play in a functioning democracy.6 But when content is at issue,
s.2(b) is notably less resilient.
As explained elsewhere in more detail, the current framework of s.2(b) methodology is
unsound and unprincipled.7 Fault lines that are embedded in the jurisprudence register at both
stages of the analysis, under the guarantee’s standard of breach, as well as under the justification
of limits under s.1. These fault lines arise principally from the Court’s landmark decisions in Ford
v. Quebec and Irwin Toy v. Quebec, and from adoption of the contextual approach under s.1.8 The
consequences for the Charter’s guarantee of expressive freedom are profound, and appear under
each branch of the analysis.

5

See Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 (statutory publication ban); Dagenais v.
Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (judicial publication ban); Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New
Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (closed courtrooms); R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 & R. v.
ONE, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478 (judicial publication bans); Re Vancouver Sun, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 332 (closed hearing);
Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188 (access to search warrants). See J.
Cameron,”A Reflection on Section 2(b)’s Quixotic Journey, 1982-2012” (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 163, at 184-90
(“Quixotic Journey”)(praising the open justice jurisprudence as a “section 2(b) template”).
6 See R v. Vice Media Canada Inc., [2018] 3 SCR 374 (concluding that it was neither desirable nor necessary to
address the constitutional status of the press under s.2(b)). But see CBC v. New Brunswick (AG), [1996] 3 S.C.R.
480; R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442; R. v. ONE, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478; Re Vancouver Sun, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 332;
Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188. (providing exemplary analysis of
the vital links between a free press, the open court principle, democratic self government, and the accountability
of the courts and justice system); see also Vice Media, ibid. (per Abella J., concurring and endorsing an
independent guarantee for the press and media). See generally J. Cameron, “Section 2(b)’s Other Fundamental
Freedom: The Press Guarantee, 1982-2012”, in L. Taylor and C-M. O’Hagan, eds., The Unfulfilled Promise of Press
Freedom in Canada (Toronto: U. of Toronto Press, 2017); B. Oliphant, “Does Independent Protection for Freedom
of the Press Make a Difference?: The Case of Vice Media v. Canada (Attorney General)”, in Bird, Newman & Ross,
eds., D. Newman, D.Ross, & B. Bird, eds., The Forgotten Fundamental Freedoms of the Charter, (Canada: LexisNexis
Canada Inc., 2020) (“Forgotten Freedoms”)
7 J. Cameron, “Big M’s Forgotten Legacy of Freedom” (“Forgotten Legacy”), in Forgotten Freedoms, ibid. at 17-62
(critiquing the s.2(b) jurisprudence); “Quixotic Journey”, supra note 5, at 167-73 (criticizing s.2(b) methodology).
8 Ford v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec, [1989] 1 SCR 927. The contextual approach was
derived from Justice Wilson’s concurring opinion in Edmonton Journal, supra note 5; see discussion infra.
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Critically, the current methodology marginalizes the concept of breach in significant ways.
First, s.2(b) lacks a conception of freedom to ground the entitlement and inform the analysis of
breach. Forty years on, the jurisprudence has yet to offer a theory of freedom that safeguards the
voices of difference and dissent. This is a serious deficiency that must be corrected to meet s.2(b)’s
unerring challenge – of explaining why the Charter protects all views, including the ideologically
and morally offensive. Precisely because it engages our strongest emotions and challenges deepseated instincts, it is no small feat to show why expressive content that flouts or unsettles
conventional values should be protected by the Charter.
Moreover, an abstract theory or conception cannot protect freedom on its own, and must
be accompanied by a framework of principle to address transgressions of s.2(b). Before any
question of justification arises under s.1, the analysis of breach requires a deep examination of the
Charter violation and its consequences for expressive freedom. Regrettably, that is not how current
doctrine operates. In most instances, the s.2(b) analysis is perfunctory and discussion of the
infringement is thin at best, and often non-existent. Meanwhile, the analysis of reasonable limits
under s.1 of the Charter is detailed and thorough. The lack of balance in this doctrinal scheme
necessarily privileges limits at the expense of s.2(b)’s guarantee of freedom. 9
The deficits on the s.2(b) side of the Charter’s equation of rights and limits are mirrored
under s.1. There, the central problem is the contextual approach and its unrequited use of s.2(b)’s
underlying values to discount expressive content and relax the standard of justification. 10 Under
that approach, limits do not rest on sufficient evidence of harm but rather, on pronouncements
about the relative value of expressive content. In principle, it is critical to reject the view that
expression can be limited simply because it lacks value. As explained below, protection for s.2(b)’s

9

See discussion infra.
See discussion infra.

10

5

guarantee of expressive freedom requires a retreat from the contextual approach and return to a
more disciplined standard of justification under Oakes.11
In spite of the criticisms it attracted, s.2(b)’s analytical framework has been relatively static
since Irwin Toy was decided more than thirty years ago.12 While other guarantees have been reworked and even re-invented, expressive freedom has experienced little conceptual growth.13 The
Charter’s 40th anniversary offers a moment to pause and invest in s.2(b)’s renewal.
A process of renewal can place s.2(b) on principled foundations and constrain the power
of regulators and legislators to infringe the Charter’s guarantee of expressive freedom. This
proposal addresses s.2(b) and s.1, engaging the concepts of breach and justification in a process of
holistic reform. Under s.2(b), it offers a theory of principle of freedom and reforms the current
standard of breach before turning to s.1. There, the methodology requires the elimination of the
contextual approach and a re-invigoration of the Oakes test.
This ambitious task begins with a review of the deficiencies of s.2(b)’s current foundations,
before introducing and explaining the building blocks of the proposal. What emerges from a
remake of s.2(b) doctrine is a richer conception of entitlement that deepens the analysis of breach
and treats violations of expressive freedom with the gravitas that is required by the Charter’s
guarantee of fundamental freedoms. Under s.1, the methodology in s.2(b) cases abandons the
contextual approach, restores the mandate of evidence-based decision-making, and boosts the role
of proportionality balancing to ensure that the interests at stake are fairly weighed before limits on
expressive freedom are justified.

11

See discussion infra.
See, e.g., R. Elliott, “Back to Basics: A Critical Look at the Irwin Toy Framework for Freedom of Expression”,
(2011), 15 Rev. of Const. Studies 205 (“Back to Basics”); C. Sethi, “Beyond Irwin Toy: A New Approach to Freedom
of Expression under the Charter”, (2012), 17 Appeal: Current Law and Law Reform 21 (“Beyond Irwin
Toy”)(proposing alternative approaches to s.2(b)).
13 See infra (noting the renewal and re-invention of s.2(d) and its guarantee of associational freedom).
12
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A process of renewal that is complex in its re-ordering of current doctrine rests on
fundamental principles of rights protection. These principles support a proposal to reshape s.2(b)’s
foundations and outline a robust methodology for the future. Protecting freedom of expression
depends on a culture of respect for rights and a constitutional system of rights protection. Ideally,
these dynamics can work in tandem to bolster the Charter’s guarantee of expressive freedom. At
this moment, neither is especially reliable. Resetting s.2(b)’s foundations can strengthen the
Charter’s role in protecting expressive freedom and inspire respect for freedom in the broader
democratic culture.

II.

RESETTING THE FOUNDATIONS, PART 1: THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM AND CONCEPT
OF BREACH

1. Ford, Irwin Toy, and a conception of breach under s.2(b)
Neither of the Supreme Court’s s.2(b)’s landmarks inspired a culture of respect for
expressive freedom: while Irwin Toy upheld restrictions on advertising aimed at children, Ford’s
invalidation of Quebec’s outdoor signage law marked a pyrrhic victory for expressive freedom
when the province re-enacted the legislation and relied on the override.14 Comparisons to other
branches of s.2 jurisprudence are revealing. Prior to Ford and Irwin Toy, R. v. Big M Drug Mart
spoke powerfully of freedom from religious persecution and of freedom as the absence of coercion
or constraint.15 And, though defeatist at first, the s.2(d) jurisprudence provided extensive

14

Ford v. Quebec; Irwin Toy v. Quebec, supra note 8. In provoking the government of Quebec to use the override,
Ford had spillover consequences for national unity and the Meech Lake Accord. J. Cameron, “To the Rescue:
Antonio Lamer and the Section 2(b) Cases from Quebec” in Adam Dodek & Daniel Jutras, eds., The Sacred Fire: The
Legacy of Antonio Lamer (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2009) 237, at 243-48 (explaining the link between
Quebec’s “visage linguistique”, the override, and the Meech Lake Accord).
15 R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 336 (stating that freedom can “primarily be characterized by the
absence of coercion or constraint”); see Cameron, “Forgotten Legacy”), supra note 7.
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discussion of associational freedom in the Alberta Reference, in McIntyre J.’s concurrence and in
Chief Justice Dickson’s much revered dissent.16 That dissent provided the foundation for s.2(d)’s
renewal many years later.17
In many ways, Ford’s invalidation of Quebec’s language law was monumental. Quebec’s
immediate turn to the override confirmed the risks the Court took in applying a rigorous standard
of justification and invalidating legislation of utmost sensitivity to Quebeckers. Section 2(b)’s
interpretation was also at stake. At the time, it was an open question whether the guarantee should
be restricted in scope to “political” expression. The Court rejected that approach, declaring that a
“great range of expression” is deserving of constitutional protection and concluding that there is
“no sound basis” for excluding commercial expression from the Charter.18 Ford held that s.2(b)
extends to more than the content of expression, includes choice of language in outdoor commercial
advertising, and protects the rights of listeners as well as speakers.19 On compelled expression and
the requirement to advertise only in French, the Court cited Big M, stating that one of the Charter’s
major purposes is to protect individuals from coercion or restraint by the state.20
Following the pattern of early decisions to ground the Charter’s rights and freedoms in a
foundation of principle, Ford introduced s.2(b)’s underlying values and since then, the “Ford

16

Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act, (the “Alberta Reference”), [1987] 1 SCR 313.
Freedom of association’s renewal began in 2001, when Dunmore v. Ontario endorsed Chief Justice Dickson’s
conception of association, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016. Section 2(d)’s progress continued with the overruling of s.2(d)’s
landmark precedents – the “Labour Trilogy” – in Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn.
v. British Columbia, [2007], 2 S.C.R. 391; Mounted Police Ass’n of Ontario v. Canada (AG), [2015] 1 SCR 3; and
Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan, [2015] 1 SCR 245.
18 Ford v. Quebec, supra note 8 at 764 & 767.
19 Ibid. at 748-52, and stating, at 748, that there cannot be “true” freedom of expression by means of language if
one is prohibited from using the language of one’s choice.
20 Ibid. at 751 and stating, at 748, that if a person is compelled by the state to a course of action or inaction that
otherwise would not be undertaken, that person is “not acting of his own volition and cannot be said to be truly
free”.
17
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values” have infused the jurisprudence. 21 In Ford’s iteration, those values encompass the truthseeking and -attaining functions of expression, its role in social and political decision making, and
its connection to diverse forms of individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing.22
Ford’s articulation of abstract values signalled an inclusive and undifferentiated scope of
protection that embraced virtually all human endeavours. Little, if anything, is excluded from a
conception based, essentially, on the view that expression in any of the Ford categories is valuable,
at least in the abstract. Quite understandably, the Court might have thought there was no need to
theorize rationales that supported broad and potentially unlimited protection for expressive
freedom. But as one commentator observed, Ford accepted “at face value the ‘generally’ held view
that these are the appropriate values to protect”, and then “stayed the course”, doing little to deepen
its conception of the values, or relate these values to a conception or theory of freedom. 23
That lack of reflection and development exposes a telling gap in insight – that the Ford
values do not present a theory or principle of freedom. Decision making, truth seeking, and self
fulfillment accept or presume the value of those categories of content, but make no mention of
freedom. That gap in insight is critical because, essentially without pause, the Ford values mapped
onto assumptions about expressive content that have defined the s.2(b) jurisprudence. Absent in
those assumptions is a recognition that making expressive freedom contingent on the value of the
content negates s.2(b)’s guarantee of freedom. While s.2(b) has a conception of expressive content
that is guided by Ford’s abstract values, it lacks a theory of expressive freedom. Still missing from

21

Albeit in obiter¸the Court first canvassed the role of expressive freedom in Canada’s political and constitutional
tradition in Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
22 Ford v. Quebec, supra note 8, at 765-67; Irwin Toy v. Quebec, supra note 8, at 976.
23 R. Elliot, “The Supreme Court’s Understanding of the Democratic Self-Government, Advancement of Truth, and
Knowledge and Individual Self-Realization Rationales for Protecting Freedom of Expression: Part I – Taking Stock”,
(2012), 59 S.C.L.R.(2d) 436, at 445 (“Taking Stock”).
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s.2(b) is an adequate account of freedom and why expressive freedom should be rigorously
protected by the Charter.
Part of the problem is methodological and stems from Irwin Toy’s two-step test of breach,
which adopted a prima facie concept of breach that diluted and blurred the role of Ford values
under s.2(b). Step one, which governs in the majority of cases, grants prima facie protection to
“every attempt to convey meaning”.24 Nothing further, including a discussion of Ford values or
the severity of the breach, is required; that threshold rests on an assumption of content neutrality
and the principle that content cannot be excluded without risking the disapproval and even
censorship of unpopular points of view. 25 In this way and, perhaps inadvertently, Irwin Toy
diminished the Ford values because it enabled courts to make a summary finding of breach and
shift the analysis to s.1.26 That approach lowered the claimant’s burden under s.2(b) but dispensed
with the guarantee’s values, effectively relegating them to irrelevance at that stage of the analysis.
Paradoxically, then, Irwin Toy’s generous interpretation of expression undermined s.2(b), because
its prima facie standard of breach rendered analysis of the nature and severity of the violation
unnecessary.
Section 2(b)’s analytical framework is complicated by Irwin Toy’s second step, the
purpose-effects test, which asks whether the government action purposely violates expressive
freedom or adversely affects it.27 Though most interferences are purposeful – in the sense of

24

Irwin Toy, supra note 8, at 969 (stating that if an activity conveys or attempts to convey meaning it has
expressive content and prima facie falls within the scope of s.2(b)). Elliot noted with surprise that the Ford values
did not play a role or influence Irwin Toy’s definition of expression. Elliot, “Taking Stock”, supra note 21, at 445.
25 The Court stated that freedom of expression was entrenched so that “everyone can manifest their thoughts,
opinion, indeed all expressions of the heart and mind, however unpopular, distasteful or contrary to the
mainstream”. Irwin Toy, supra note 8, at 969.
26 Subject to the purpose-effects test, which does not apply in every case, there is a prima facie breach of s.2(b)
whenever the government interferes with “any attempt to convey meaning”. The caveat to the attempt-to-convey
meaning test is the Court’s exclusion, under step one, for “violent forms of expression” from s. 2(b) (at 970).
27. Ibid. at 978-79 (summarizing the test).
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placing facial limits on expressive activity – the claimant bears a more onerous standard of proving
a s. 2(b) breach for those that are not. Under Irwin Toy, effects-based interferences with expressive
freedom do not violate s.2(b) unless the claimant establishes that the activity adversely affected by
state action advances the guarantee’s underlying values, namely, the Ford values.28 This test is
confusing because it is inconsistent with step one’s principle of content neutrality. 29 Moreover,
and though it plays a muted role in the jurisprudence, Irwin Toy’s overlay of purpose-effects
analysis is problematic. 30 By undermining a concept of freedom based on content neutrality, the
effects-based analysis demonstrated how the Ford values could be used to exclude content from
s.2(b). As explained below, under the guise of a contextual approach, a very similar analysis
quickly surfaced in the s.1 analysis.
In combination, Ford and Irwin Toy present a perplexing and anomalous concept of
expressive freedom. The Ford values do not advance a theory of freedom, and in any case were
sidelined by Irwin Toy, except when used to impose a content-related burden on effects-based
violations of s.2(b). The prima facie scope of entitlement and pro forma presence of Ford values
are the hallmarks of a methodology that fails to engage with the infringement and its implications
for expressive freedom. In joining a thin concept of entitlement with an extensive analysis of

28

Ibid. at 976 (stating that to establish a breach, the plaintiff must state her claim “with reference to the principles
and values underlying the freedom”) and 977 (adding that she must “identify the meaning being conveyed and
how it relates to the pursuit of truth, participation in the community, or individual self-fulfillment and human
flourishing”).
29 Despite identifying it as the underlying assumption of s.2(b), Irwin Toy did little more to develop the principle of
content neutrality, or treat it as an imperative and requirement for the protection of expressive freedom. The
tension between step one’s content neutrality and the content-based inquiry of step two’s effects-based violations
remains intact in s.2(b). As explained, the contextual approach would facilitate a content-based approach to the
justification of limits under s.1.
30 The Ford values also play a role on questions of s.2(b) access to government property and information. See
Montreal (City) v. 2952-1366, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141, at paras. 73, (stating that s.2(b) protects access to public
property where expressive content is not in conflict with the guarantee’s three central purposes); Ontario v.
Criminal Lawyers’ Association of Ontario, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 3 (addressing s.2(b) access to information).
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limits under s.1, Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott provides a compelling
illustration of the consequences. There, the Court’s discussion of s.2(b) was completed in a single
paragraph and was followed by a s.1 analysis that was 88 paragraphs long.31 Regrettably, Whatcott
is not atypical, but indicative of the lack of balance – or proportionality, to invoke a revered
Charter concept – between the Court’s treatment of breach and justification in s.2(b) cases.32
Toward a conception of freedom
After forty years, s.2(b) lacks an iconic statement of free expression’s inherent and
transcending value. Part of the problem is that, unlike other guarantees, s.2(b)’s freedom of
expression has not had a champion – a jurist willing to theorize and defend freedom in principle
and across issues.33 Nor is the genesis of the Ford values rooted in Canada’s constitutional
jurisprudence; rather, s.2(b)’s foundations trace to and essentially re-state the underpinnings of the
First Amendment’s free speech clause. In the United States, the jurisprudence grants free speech
powerful and at times inspired protection that is complemented by a rich scholarly literature on
free speech.34 In Canada, the s.2(b) jurisprudence surprisingly makes scarce reference to a pre-

31

Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 467. Compare paragraph 62 (agreeing
with the Commission’s concession that the statutory provision violated s.2(b)), and paragraphs 63-151 (discussing
the justifiability of the violation under s.1 of the Charter).
32 But see R. v. Keegstra,[1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at 725-34 (per Dickson C.J.) and 802-43 (per McLachlin J., in
dissent)(providing an elaborate discussion of s.2(b) and its scope of protection); R. v. Zundel, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 731
(per McLachlin J., at p. 751-60) discussing the scope of s.2(b) and the guarantee’s reasons for protecting beliefs the
majority regards as wrong or false). By the time of Whatcott, the general analysis under s.2(b) was abbreviated and
the question of breach was often conceded.
33 Some of its most significant s.2(b) decisions protecting expressive freedom are authored by different members
of the Court. See, e.g., Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. MacIntyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175 (Dickson J., pre-Charter);
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lessard, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 459 (McLachlin J., dissenting); Dagenais v. Canadian
Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (Chief Justice Lamer); Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, [1998] 1 S.C.R.
877 (Bastarache J.); Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 (Justices Iacobucci & Arbour); Montreal (City) c. 29511366 Quebec Inc., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 141 (Binnie J., dissenting); and R. v. Vice Media Ltd., [2018] 3 S.C.R. 374 (Abella J.,
concurring).
34 See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (2019); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); New York
Times Co. v. the United States (The Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971); and Cohen v. California, 4 03 U.S. 15
(1971), among others. In addition, a vibrant First Amendment literature continues the search for a single
organizing principle to ground the free speech clause. Each of the Ford values has analogues and advocates in this
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Charter jurisprudence that displayed a forceful, compelling, and unexpected defence of freedom.35
Rather than consult that pre-Charter legacy and learn from its response to government repression,
Ford borrowed abstract values from the First Amendment.36
On the principal issue of freedom and its meaning under s.2(b), this proposal draws
inspiration from, and is anchored in, four pre-Charter decisions on expressive freedom, the
“legacy” jurisprudence. Hidden in plain sight, this jurisprudence comprises The Alberta Press
Case, R. v. Boucher, Saumur v. City of Quebec, and Switzman v. Elbling. 37 As timely as ever, this
jurisprudence offers a foundation that can enrich s.2(b)’s conception of freedom and inform the
analysis of breach.
A dynamic episode in Canadian constitutionalism that began with The Alberta Press case
continued with a prosecution for seditious libel in Boucher, Saumur’s bylaw scheme of street
censorship, and Switzman’s padlock law aimed at halting the propagation of communism and
bolshevism on residential premises. In combination, these decisions reached a jurisprudential apex
for freedom that arguably has not been attained in forty years under the Charter.38

exercise, thought characteristically there is little agreement on whether a sole principle can or should be found,
much less what it might be. 34 See, e.g., A. Tsesis, “Free Speech Constitutionalism”, 2015 U.Ill.L.Rev. 1015
(explaining why none of the accepted rationales is sufficient on its own and proposing “unified statement of free
speech theory”).
35 Reference re: Alberta Legislation, [1938] S.C.R. 100 (“Alberta Press”, or The Alberta Press Case”); Boucher v. the
King, [1951] S.C.R. 265 (“Boucher”); Saumur v. Québec (City), [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 (“Saumur”); Switzman v. Elbling,
[1957] S.C.R. 285 “Switzman”). These decisions are cited from time to time in the jurisprudence, on their own and
in combination, but not to ground or create a foundation for s.2(b)’s guarantee of expressive freedom.
36 In addition to citing the First Amendment jurisprudence on free speech, the Court cited R. Sharpe, “Commercial
Expression and the Charter”, (1987), 37 U.T.L.J. 229, at 232 (endorsing the First Amendment’s rationales for free
speech under the Charter). See Elliot, “Taking Stock”, supra note 23 at 444 (stating that at no point in this
discussion did the Court consider its own early Charter decisions, and that nor did it mention the pre-Charter
jurisprudence – the legacy decisions in this article – that explain the benefits to society that flow from freedom of
expression).
37 Supra note 35.
38 See note 33, supra (identifying some of the Charterr’s more principled s.2(b) decisions).
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Pronouncements that represent expressive freedom’s true and forgotten foundations should now
be brought forward.
Confronting the threat to freedom is the distinction and genius of these decisions. The
Court’s focus on the nature and severity of the interference with freedom in these cases is striking,
especially when juxtaposed with the absence of a Charter counterpart and the emptiness of the
s.2(b) analysis. What especially sets the legacy jurisprudence apart is the way members of the
Court countered the state’s repressive actions by defending freedom. Not content with reciting
abstract values, the judges responded with opinions rich in the rhetoric of freedom. These opinions
did not consider the violation a pro forma breach, as occurs under s.2(b), but treated it as the
catalyst for an inspired commitment to freedom. As such, these legacy decisions foreshadowed
and aligned with Big M’s definition of freedom as the absence of coercion and constraint. 39
For members of the Court, a threat that could not adequately be addressed by the division
of powers called for a fledging theory of freedom. Though Rand J. was the pioneer and champion
of this initiative, a number of other jurists, including Chief Justice Duff and Justices Cannon, Estey,
Locke, Cartwright, Kellock, and Abbott, actively defended freedom of expression.40 Years before
the Charter, these four bold decisions pressed up against the limits of the Court’s constitutional
authority. That the Court lodged its views awkwardly under the structure of federalism does not
detract from the creation of a jurisprudential foundation for freedom. Instead, the doctrinal and
institutional obstacles to protecting freedom underscore the courage of these moments in Supreme
Court history.
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In the absence of textual rights, the Court had little choice but to fit its conception of
freedom into the broader legal and constitutional tradition. Perhaps because it was not tethered to
a text or Charter–like separation of breach and justification, the Court’s conception of freedom
was unrehearsed, organic, and authentic. Looking back, what stands out is how much could be said
– even within the limits of a division of powers framework – about freedom and its foundational
place in Canadian constitutionalism.
In The Alberta Press Case, the scale and gravity of repression impelled Chief Justice Duff
and Justice Cannon to intervene in defence of freedom.41 Legislation requiring newspapers to print
government propaganda and disclose all sources of information, under threat of being shut down
for non-compliance, granted “autocratic powers” that could be “arbitrarily wielded” to frustrate
the rights, not only of Albertans, but of “the people of Canada as a whole”.42 Cannon J.’s opinion
denounced the government’s attempt to “prevent a free and untrammelled discussion” and “reduce
any opposition to silence” as a dangerous affront to the “free working of the political organization
of the Dominion”.43 The legislation not only nullified the rights of Albertans, but affected the
political rights of citizens in other provinces who have a “vital interest” in access to full
information and comment, both favourable and unfavourable, about the policies of the Alberta
government.44 The legislation’s silencing of political opposition prompted Cannon J. to declare
that freedom of discussion is “essential to enlighten public opinion in a democratic State,” and
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Supra note 35. Bill 9 was part of a package of measures enacted by Alberta’s Social Credit government, and was
titled “An Act to Ensure the Publication of Accurate News and Information”. The press law was ancillary to ultra
vires legislation and unconstitutional for that reason. Though it was unnecessary to address the government’s
repression of expressive and press freedom, Duff C.J., with Davis J. concurring, stated that there were “some
further observations” which “may properly be made”. Ibid. at 132. Cannon J. was alone in finding that Bill 9 also
violated the division of powers. See R. Haigh, “The Kook, the Chief, Some Strife an the Lawyers: William Aberhart
and the Alberta References of 1938”, (2019), 39 N.J.C.L 1 (examining the political concept of social credit, the
Alberta premier, and the three Reference decisions of 1938).
42 Ibid. at 135 (per Duff C.J.) (emphasis added).
43 Ibid. at 144, 146 (emphasis added).
44Ibid. at 146.
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therefore cannot be curtailed without affecting “the right of the people” for access to information
on questions of public interest from sources independent of the government. 45
Chief Justice Duff and Cannon J. asserted that democratic institutions derive their
“efficacy” from the free public discussion of affairs, including a citizen’s “fundamental right to
express freely his untrammelled opinion about government policies and discuss matters of public
opinion,” and an “untrammelled publication of the news and political opinions of the political
parties contending for ascendancy”. 46 The Chief Justice’s commitment to the “freest and fullest”
examination from every point of view – which he described as the very “breath of life for
parliamentary institutions” – could not be compromised by abuse, including grave abuse.47
Whether in criticism or counter-criticism, attack or counter-attack, freedom was so vital, in his
view, that abuses – including those that are “constantly exemplified before our eyes” – should be
dismissed as little more than “incidental mischiefs”.48
Shortly after the Supreme Court of Canada became the country’s final court of appeal in
1949, Quebec’s suppression of religious and expressive freedom in the 1950s generated three
magnificent decisions that drew strength from The Alberta Press Case.49 By targeting religious
and political minorities and singling them out for persecution under the law, the province provoked
the Court to defend freedom qua freedom. The key opinions in Boucher, Saumur, and Switzman
reflect the insight that the true issue at stake was the freedom, and not the content of expression.
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In narrow terms, the question in Boucher v. the King was whether a religious pamphlet by
the Jehovah’s Witnesses constituted an act of sedition against the state. 50 A majority held that,
short of incitement, expressive activity that promotes ill will between groups, even to the point of
hatred, cannot be criminalized, because that would “very seriously curtail the liberty of the press
and of individuals to engage in discussion of any controversial topic.”51 Justice Kellock asserted
that the instigator, not the distributor of a pamphlet, is responsible for any breach of the peace.52
Rand J. added that the clash of critical discussion on political, social and religious subjects has
“too deeply become the stuff of life” for “mere ill-will” to be the test of illegality. 53
Justice Rand’s remarks on difference and dissent set the foundations for a theory of
freedom for Canadian constitutionalism. His forceful rhetoric praised the “clash of critical
discussion” – including “controversial fury”, “fanatical puritanism”, and hostility – as the
hallmarks of freedom.54 He proclaimed that disagreement in ideas and beliefs, on “every
conceivable subject,” is “of the essence of our life” and is “part of our living”. 55 In this view, “our
compact of free society” absorbs the “subjective incidents of controversy” within the framework
of freedom and order, because a process of free exchange “ultimately serves us in stimulation, in
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Boucher v. the King, ibid. (acquitting Boucher of a charge of seditious libel, by a 5-4 vote, because there was no
evidence on which a properly instructed jury could find him guilty). See Kerwin J., at 283 (stating that seditious libel
requires an intent to incite the people to violence against constituted authority or to create a public disturbance or
disorder against that authority); Cartwright J. at 333 (stating that the intended or probable consequences of any
promotion of ill-will and hostility is to produce disturbance of or resistance to the government’s authority), Kellock
J. at 301 and Estey J. at 315 (confirming that an intention to incite violence or disorder against the state is
essential).
51 Ibid. at 333 (per Cartwright J.).
52 Ibid. at 301 (stating that any other view would “elevate mob violence to a place of supremacy,” and adding that
“the lawbreakers are those who resort to violence rather than those who exercise the right of free speech in
advocating religious views however such views may be unacceptable to the former”).
53 Ibid. at 288 (per Rand J.) (re-inforcing the view that creating disaffection or ill-will or hostility short of illegal
conduct is not a crime).
54 Ibid. at 288.
55 Ibid.
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the clarification of thought and … the search for the constitution and truth of things generally”.56
Rand J. accepted it as “part of the compact” that Boucher’s pamphlet would provoke and inflame.
Though it was a “burning protest”, the pamphlet represented an expression of “deep indignation”
and an “earnest petition” to the province to discontinue its “iniquitous treatment” of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses.57
Within two years, the Court considered another test of provincial authority when Saumur,
a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, challenged a Quebec City bylaw forbidding the distribution
of any literature on city streets without first obtaining written permission from the Chief of
Police.58 A majority found that the bylaw was not enacted in relation to streets, but regulated “the
minds of the users of the streets” and was clearly an instance of censorship. 59 More to the point,
the bylaw was an offence to freedom because it granted the Chief of Police the power to control
street activity that had been taking place “since time immemorial”. 60 The uncensored printed word
is the “bête noire of the dogmatists”, and the threat of censorship posed by the bylaw was therefore
pervasive, even contagious, and capable of spreading from religious to political and other points
of view.61 Noting its “commendable frankness” in conceding the point, Locke J. considered the
City’s overt goal of censorship a matter of “profound importance” to “all of the people of this
country.”62
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Ibid. at 291.
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59 Ibid. at 338 (per Kellock J.) and 379 (per Locke J.).
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Finally, Switzman considered provincial legislation that criminalized the propagation of
communism or bolshevism in any house, and authorized the province to close, or “padlock” such
premises.63 While a majority on the panel invalidated the legislation as ultra vires under the
division of powers, some judges addressed the demands of freedom. For instance, Abbott J.
strenuously defended the right of free expression on social, political or economic matters,
describing this freedom as essential to the “working of a parliamentary democracy” and suggesting
in obiter that even Parliament cannot abrogate this right.64
Justice Rand wrote forcefully in defence of freedom – as he had in Boucher and Saumur –
denouncing the statute’s attempt to prevent “a poisoning of men’s minds”, shield individuals from
exposure to “dangerous ideas”, and protect them from their own “thinking propensities”. 65 He was
particularly troubled that the object of the prohibition could “just as properly have been the
suppression of any other political, economic or social doctrine or theory”. 66 Justice Rand
maintained, to the contrary, that “government by the free public opinion of an open society”
demands the “condition of a virtually unobstructed access to and diffusion of ideas”. 67 In stating
that freedom of discussion has a “unity of interest and significance extending equally to every part
of the Dominion”, Rand J. pressed the Court’s constitutional authority to its limit but stopped short
of creating an enforceable substantive right. 68
A divided Court vindicated the freedom claim in each of the Quebec decisions. A number
of judges resisted the repression of expressive freedom and voiced unparalleled concern for the
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Propaganda was ultra vires the province as a regulation of the criminal law.
64 Ibid. at 328.
65 Ibid. at 305 (per Rand J.).
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid. at 306.
68 Ibid.
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gravitas of the violation. An emergent theory of freedom is more developed in Justice Rand’s
opinions, and though his conception warrants much closer attention, including critical scrutiny,
key themes can be noted. 69 First is Rand J.’s conception of the relationship between the democratic
community and its government. As he explained in Boucher, “the administrators of what we call
democratic government have come to be looked upon as servants, bound to carry out their duties
accountably to the public”.70 In Saumur he added that if free discussion is placed under license,
its basic condition would be destroyed and the government, as licensor, would be “disjoined from
the citizenry”.71 Finally, Switzman stated that “[p]arliamentary government postulates a capacity
in men, acting freely and under self-restraints, to govern themselves”. 72 Meeting that responsibility
in turn demands a virtually unobstructed access to and diffusion of ideas.73 In short, and without
putting it quite that way, he recognized that freedom is a requisite of democratic accountability
and an essential feature of a functioning democracy.
Second, Justice Rand did not limit the right of free public opinion and debate to the
precincts of parliamentary government. He described freedom of speech as one of the “original
freedoms” that are the “necessary attributes and modes of self-expression of human beings and the
primary condition of their community life within a legal order”. 74 In Switzman, Rand J. stated that
this “constitutional” fact, of virtually free access to ideas, is the “political” expression of the
primary condition of “social” life, thought and its communication by language. 75 In that
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conception, liberty is elemental and “little less vital to man’s mind and spirit than breathing is to
his physical existence”. 76 To Justice Rand, freedom is paramount, stopping “only at perimeters
where the foundation of the freedom itself is threatened.” 77 Apart from sedition, obscenity and
criminal libel, the “literary, discursive and polemic use of language” are, in the broadest sense,
free.78
Third, Rand J. focused on the gravitas of the threat to freedom. In Switzman, as well as in
Saumur, he emphasized that the government could just as easily target any other expressive content
it found objectionable.79 The freedom at risk in each of these circumstances placed the principle
of freedom at risk everywhere. In such circumstances, explaining what was fundamentally at stake
brought him close to an all-embracing conception of freedom. In Saumur, Rand J. declared that
“[t]he only security is steadily advancing enlightenment, for which the widest range of controversy
is the sine qua non”.80 Though his precise meaning is unclear, Rand J.’s use of “enlightenment”
suggests an open, process-oriented, at times combative, and content-neutral concept of free
discussion and exchange. Echoing Chief Justice Duff’s view that its abuse is “an incidental
mischief”, Justice Rand described freedom as the residue within a periphery where the positive
law operates to create “minor exceptions” to liberty. 81 As he emphasized in all three opinions,
limits on freedom are not the norm but, instead, are exceptional and peripheral in nature.
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Enduring themes emerge from this jurisprudence. In this legacy, freedom is processoriented and in its time, strikingly neutral and capacious in scope. A range of opinions from
members of the Court accepted rigorous, disputatious, and even hostile exchange as inherent and
welcome properties of freedom. Prescient and in anticipation of Big M, their judicial instincts were
trained on government repression and the threat it posed to the integrity of freedom. For s.2(b)’s
purposes, it matters little that the Court’s burgeoning conception of freedom was not rooted in text,
or that it drew on disparate images and strands of jurisprudential thought. On any measure, the
legacy decisions offer a wealth of insight that should inform the interpretation of s.2(b)’s guarantee
of expressive freedom. Even and especially on the Charter’s 40th anniversary this legacy remains
relevant and can play a pivotal role in s.2(b)’s renewal.
2. The first foundation: a conception of freedom under s.2(b)
Re-aligning s.2(b)’s methodology is not a simple or modest task, and is addressed here in
two steps. First is a principle or theory of freedom that must offer more than a re-consideration of
Ford values and their role in the s.2(b) analysis.82 As discussed, the Ford values explain why
expressive content is valuable but overlook the value of freedom. A conception of freedom itself
– apart from the merits of expressive content – was lost in the interpretation of s.2(b). Second, a
concept alone cannot protect freedom, and in turn must be reflected in a principled approach to the
question of breach. This proposal reconfigures the current methodology by eliminating step two
of Irwin Toy and replacing it with s.2(a)’s standard of infringement.
On the threshold question of freedom, the legacy jurisprudence provides leadership on two
key points: the core value of freedom and the gravity or threat to freedom inherent in its repression

82
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protection of expressive freedom.
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by the government. While some judges expressed grave concerns about the censorial and
repressive acts of government – describing their consequences for a culture of free public
discussion – Justice Rand’s opinions were more seeking in nature. In his search to find and express
freedom’s core value, or truth, Rand J. developed a conception that is content-neutral, processbased, and grounded in a view of expression as an agent of enlightenment, or change. Thus he
spoke of freedom’s purposes, variously, as being linked to “stimulation”, the “clarification of
thought”, and the “search for the constitution and truth of things generally”.83 Rand J. described
freedom of speech as one of the “original freedoms” that are the “necessary attributes and modes
of self-expression of human beings and the primary conditions of their community life within a
legal order”.84 Critically, Justice Rand’s conception separated freedom from its content, and shifted
the focus from the substance of expressive activity to the principle of freedom.
It remains to relate the elements of this nascent conception of freedom to the Ford values
and s.2(b)’s guarantee of expressive freedom. In primal terms, freedom tests a democratic
community’s courage to confront its own doubts and fears, and to summon humility in the face of
what is unknown, unknowable, and uncertain. 85 In this matrix, the social and political freedom to
challenge, test, and engage in discourse animates a process of change that democratic society
depends on for its vitality and progress. That process of engagement is subject to limits but, in
principle and at its forefront, is organic, fortuitous, and free.
Under this conception, freedom is consistent with Irwin Toy’s principle of content
neutrality because it enables an open process of free exchange. A conception of freedom focused
on processes of discovery, debate, and dispute bears resemblance to the truth-seeking function of

83

Boucher, supra note 35, at 288.
Saumur, supra note 35 at 329.
85 See also Cameron, “Forgotten Legacy”, in Bird, Newman & Ross, Forgotten Freedoms, eds., supra note 7 at 38-41
(providing a preliminary discussion or account of freedom).
84

23

the Ford values and the First Amendment tradition. The drawback in promoting truth as an
organizing principle of freedom is that the concept is abstract, philosophic, religious, and
empirical; what is or is not truth is contested, as well as endlessly and inevitably elusive.86 By
contrast, a truth-seeking rationale places the emphasis elsewhere, on the process of search. Under
that variation, truth is an aspiration and not an outcome. A functional approach to freedom protects
the process of seeking truth, regardless whether truth can be or is found. In principle, that process
of search and discovery is freedom’s truth.
A theory of freedom grounded in a process of free exchange references Justice Holmes’s
magnetic and ever contested “marketplace of ideas” metaphor. In Abrams v. United States, Justice
Holmes spoke of “free trade in ideas” and the “competition of the market” as the best test of truth
and the foundation of the First Amendment’s free speech clause.87 Few constitutional metaphors
have attracted more scholarly attention and critical scrutiny, and while Holmes’s elements of
“truth” and “marketplace” may not have stood the test of time, the conception of a contest between
ideas not only endures but continues to intrigue, in Canada as well as the United States.88
One of the First Amendment’s foremost scholars, Vincent Blasi, attempted to rescue the
Abrams metaphor from its improvident roots in marketplace behaviour. He shifted the concept
away from that analogy and moved toward another theme in Justice Holmes’s philosophy: value
skepticism and an ethic of fallibilism.89 In this view, certain truth is disarmed by contingency and
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uncertainty, and therefore cannot claim infallibility; rather, freedom serves the goal of “truthlocating”. Accepting that truth cannot be defined for all times and purposes, freedom of speech
provides a “comparatively reliable social mechanism for identifying error, for locating truth and,
in the aggregate, for advancing social knowledge”.90 What can be attained, in the face of fallibility,
is a commitment to the process of truth seeking that both requires, and depends on, a principle of
freedom.
The value of freedom, in this account, is that it provides a counterpoint to a “[c]onformity,
deference to authority, stasis, [and] passivity in the realm of beliefs” that is “not just unfortunate
or unwise but dangerous”.91 In that environment, voices of difference and dissent can generate
“some of the grievances, aspirations and mobilizations that force political adaptation and
transformation”.92 In this, it must be accepted and understood that protecting freedom according
to principle is not cost-free. Yet the “remote harms” that are associated with or attributed to
expression that is subversive of social values should not be regulated, because the legitimate and
ongoing process of challenging and displacing dominant forces is inseparable from the process of
“adaptive political change”.93
In this rendering, freedom has modest aspirations. It makes no claim that expressive content
is progressive or valuable, and does not promise it will achieve any, or demonstrable objectives.
There are no “heroic assumptions regarding human rationality or self-correcting social dynamics,”
and no promise of “wisdom through mass deliberation”. 94 In trusting to a process of open
discussion and exchange, this model speaks to Justice Rand’s aspiration of “steadily advancing
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enlightenment”.95 It accepts that there will be steps forward and back, and progress as well as
setbacks.96 With the risks it entails, this principle of freedom offers the goal and opportunity to
seek the “truth of things generally”, mindful and hopeful of achieving progressive objectives along
the way.
Section 2(b)’s renewal begins with a vitalized conception of freedom. While Justice
Holmes’s rationale was discounted for its marketplace and economic analogies, Justice Rand’s
conception of a link between freedom and the quest for truth or enlightenment has been overlooked
and overshadowed by the Ford values and a focus on the value of content. As yet, the s.2(b)
jurisprudence has not fully grasped why freedom – qua freedom – is indispensable to democratic
life, and that is because it advances, promotes, enables, and even forces change. A conception of
freedom as the agent of change – or change maker – has pedigree in the legacy jurisprudence, in
the Ford values and their endorsement of truth-seeking, and in a re-modelled and non-economic
version of Holmes’s process theory of freedom.97
Freedom conceived this way cannot be flabby or timid, and must accept the limits of our
knowledge and expectations, as individuals and as a community. Democratic society is restless
and dynamic, contingent and changing. That is its strength but also a source of fear, including fear
of freedom. Surely, the most compelling lesson of the legacy jurisprudence is that fear centers on
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those who dissent or speak in a different voice. That jurisprudence also provides compelling
demonstration of the irrevocable link between freedom and the principle of democracy, as
subsequently identified in the Secession Reference as one of the Constitution’s cornerstone
unwritten constitutional principles. 98
3. A conception of breach under section 2(b)
The question of breach is currently governed by Irwin Toy and its two-step test. Beyond
providing a prima facie criterion that is easily satisfied, the attempt-to-convey meaning test adds
little depth to the analysis. In re-drawing the standard for breach under s.2(b), this proposal
eliminates step 2 of the Irwin Toy test and replaces it with the standard of infringement for s.2(a)’s
guarantee for freedom of conscience and religion. Accordingly, a violation of s.2(b) is established
when the government’s interference with expressive freedom is more than trivial or insubstantial. 99
In addition, the freedom principle must be reflected in an analysis that engages, under that step,
with the nature and severity of the violation.
Over the years, calls for a re-calibration of Irwin Toy, in particular to claw back s.2(b)’s
broad, undifferentiated protection, have gone unanswered.100 Though limits can readily be upheld
under s.1, it is offensive to some that indisputably criminal, hostile, or offensive expression is
granted any constitutional recognition at all. 101 Revisiting Irwin Toy could address some of s.2(b)’s
counter-intuitive examples, such as perjury and fraud, which are prima facie protected under step
one of the test. In addition, excluding narrowly prescribed content or drawing distinctions between
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categories of expression could boost protection for s.2(b) by raising the standard of justification
under 1.102 Yet to this day, Irwin Toy remains steadfast and implacably in place as the governing
precedent on freedom of expression.103
Section 2(b) doctrine should be modified but not, as suggested above, to add content-based
substantive standards or exclude categories of expression from the Charter. Freedom breeds doubt
and can pose danger to the status quo. For that reason, its place in our order of values is vulnerable,
easily overridden in times of trouble, turmoil, and doubt. Section 2(b)’s imperative of freedom
must prevail to the point at which expressive activity poses a risk of demonstrable harm to the
community. That is where limits on freedom can be justified, but only under the discipline of a
rigorous s.1 analysis. Put another way, expressive content and any harm it might cause are in
principle extraneous to the initial question whether the government has violated s.2(b).104
Irwin Toy’s principle of prima facie protection for all content of expression is sound, but
cannot serve as the standard that moves the analysis from s.2(b) to s.1 without more. Before s.1 is
engaged, the nature and gravitas of the violation must be registered under s.2(b). Specifically,
courts must examine and explain the insult to freedom, as well as its consequences for expressive
freedom and the guarantee’s underlying values. That is imperative because, at present, the s.2(b)
analysis is bereft of this element, and expressive freedom is severely disadvantaged under s.1 as a
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See Sethi, “Beyond Irwin Toy”, supra note 9 (proposing an approach that would ensure that limits on “core”
expressive content would be properly subjected to a heightened level of scrutiny).
103 It should be noted that there are issue-specific doctrines have evolved to address the open court principle, the
status of the press and media, access to government property for s.2(b) purposes, and the scope of positive
obligations under s.2(b) of the Charter. These are not addressed in this article.
104 The caveat is Irwin Toy’s exclusion for violent forms of expression and the Court’s definition of this concept.
Irwin Toy, supra note 8, at 970, and Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of
Students, 2009] 2 S.C.R. 295, at 315 (excluding violent expression and threats of violence from the scope of s.2(b)).
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result. Not to address this gap leaves the analysis incomplete, sending a barebones finding of
breach to s.1.105
Before addressing that task, Irwin Toy’s second step – the purpose-effects test – must be
dropped from the methodology of breach. The purpose-effects test is infrequently invoked and
plays a limited role in the s.2(b) analysis. More to the point, the standard for effects-based
violations imposes a burden on claimants to establish the value of expressive content. 106 That
burden is inconsistent with the content neutrality of step one and contrary to a concept of s.2(b)
that protects freedom of expression. Eliminating this step nonetheless leaves s.2(b) without a
standard of infringement and doctrinal mechanism for discussing the severity of the violation.
In place of the purpose-effects test, Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem and its test for
violations of s.2(a)’s guarantee of religious freedom provides a good model for s.2(b). Specifically,
the second step of Irwin Toy should be replaced by Amselem’s standard of an infringement that is
more than trivial and insubstantial. The caveat is that under s.2(b), the test of non-trivial or
insubstantial interference cannot include any consideration of the expressive activity’s impact on
others.107 Section 2’s guarantees of religious and expressive freedom are closely related, but not
identical. While s.2(a) extends the Charter’s protection to religious beliefs and practices, s.2(b)
does not protect conduct or violent forms of expression, and a standard of infringement that
considers harm to others is inconsistent with s.2(b)’s principle of content neutrality. Apart from
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As noted, the jurisprudence to date demonstrates how the imbalance between breach and justification has
worked against expressive freedom, discounting the significance of the violation and leaving it barren in the
justification analysis; see Whatcott, supra note 26.
106 That burden also arises under City of Montreal’s standard for determining access to government property under
s.2(b) of the Charter; supra note 30. Addressing the government property doctrine is beyond the scope of this
discussion.
107 Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551, at para. 59. Ibid. at paras. 62-63 (stating that conduct that
potentially causes harm to others would not automatically be protected; ibid. at para.62 (emphasis added)).
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Irwin Toy’s exception for violent forms of expression, any harm to others arising from expressive
activity can only be addressed as a matter of justification under s.1.
A standard of non-trivial and not insubstantial interference with expressive freedom does
not signal a more onerous standard or restrictive approach to s.2(b). Instead, this standard is
principled because it provides a doctrinal venue for discussion and acknowledgment of the
interference with expressive freedom. In particular, the element that is missing in the current
methodology – an analysis of the nature and severity of a violation – can be incorporated into this
discussion. In analyzing the infringement, courts must acknowledge and consider how limits on
expressive freedom violate s.2(b)’s underlying principle of freedom and its truth-seeking, processbased rationale.
More must be said to explain how this standard of breach works and, in particular, how it
interacts with the Ford values. In brief, those values can work in tandem with the overarching
principle that expressive freedom advances a process of discovery and exchange that seeks truth,
enlightenment, and change. The values do not inform the question of infringement by asking
whether expressive activity is sufficiently valuable to warrant protection by s.2(b). The starting
point is a violation of freedom; from there, the Ford values can play a role in analyzing the impact
of the infringement on one or more of the guarantee’s foundational rationales (i.e., truth-seeking;
political and social decision making; individual flourishing). In this way, the infringement will be
given the attention and gravitas that s.2(b)’s guarantee of expressive freedom demands.108
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Another issue is whether the s.2(b) analysis should consider and adopt issue-specific standards for different
categories of expression (i.e., political; commercial) and whether that should be undertaken under s.2(b) or s.1.
These questions are beyond the scope of this discussion. See Sethi, “Beyond Irwin Toy”, supra note 9 (proposing
that because not all expression is equally worthy of protection, tiers of scrutiny should be introduced under s.2(b)
to direct the s.1 analysis of reasonable limits).
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The objective under s.2(b) is a generous scope of entitlement that informs a robust and
mindful consideration of the violation and its consequences for freedom. In this way, animating a
conception of freedom will fortify the analysis of breach before the issue of reasonable limits is
undertaken under s. 1. To summarize, a revised methodology of breach retains Irwin Toy’s attemptto-convey test, eliminates the purpose-effects step, and completes the analysis by adding a
threshold test of infringement borrowed from the s.2(a) jurisprudence. As such, it renews s.2(b)’s
guarantee of expressive freedom by re-setting and deepening its conceptual and analytical
foundations.

III.

RESETTING

THE FOUNDATIONS, PART

2:

SECTION

1,

THE CONTEXTUAL APPROACH,

AND A CONCEPTION OF JUSTIFICATION

Renewing the s.1 methodology for violations of s.2(b) is also imperative, but somewhat
more complex because of its implications for other Charter rights and guarantees. While
admittedly a piecemeal approach to s.1 reform, this proposal speaks to s.2(b), sketching the
elements of a standard of justification that, when paired with the conception of breach set out
above, sets a principled framework for s.2(b) decision making.
Where a breach of s.2(b) requires justification, the s.1 analysis requires attention to three
key issues: the contextual approach, the evidentiary requirements of proof, and the proportionality
balancing of salutary benefits and deleterious consequences. As explained above, the use of
context to assess the value of expressive content is unsound in principle. More to the point, the
dual roles the Ford values play under s.2(b) and s.1, and their direct influence on the question of
limits, are a hallmark and central drawback of the s.2(b) jurisprudence.

The comparative
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irrelevance of the Ford values under s.2(b) becomes more pronounced when juxtaposed with their
determinative role under s.1’s contextual approach.
This approach appeared early in s.2(b)’s evolution before other elements of the s.1 analysis,
and especially the proportionality analysis, were developed. 109 The backdrop is Oakes, which
created a structured analytical framework that seemingly failed to accommodate the context of
competing values.110 Justice Wilson identified this gap in Edmonton Journal and proposed a
contextual approach to place the values at stake “in sharp relief”.111 By directing that expressive
content should be measured against the Ford values, Chief Justice Dickson gave Wilson J.’s
fledgling concept doctrinal form in R. v. Keegstra.112 Though the contextual approach provided a
mechanism for weighing values that the prevailing interpretation of Oakes did not accommodate,
that gap in the test has now been filled by an enriched form of proportionality balancing.113
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In 1997, a few years after the contextual approach was established under s.2(b), Peter Hogg wrote that the
Court “goes through the motion” on this test, though it has “never had any influence on the outcome of a case”.
He concluded, as a result, that this step can “safely be ignored”. P. Hogg, Constitutional Law, 4th ed. (Toronto:
Thomson Canada Ltd., 1997) at 898. Note also that Sethi would eliminate this step because it does little work and
there is “no need for a free-standing inquiry at this stage”. Sethi, “Beyond Irwin Toy”, supra note 9, at 40. More to
the point, this step of Oakes amounts to a “naked balancing exercise”. Ibid.
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Irwin Toy proposed a significant modification to the s.1 analysis, with the proposal for a bifurcated standard of
analysis that turned on whether the state acted as the singular antagonist of the claimant, or in its role of mediating
social concerns and allocating scarce resources. While it remains active on occasion, this doctrinal modification to
Oakes had mixed success, at best. Supra note 8, at 989-90.
111 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (AG), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, at 1355 (emphasis in original removed). In particular,
the purpose of this approach was to address the merits of rights and their limits in an equivalent and contextual
manner, and not to set abstract values of entitlement against competing interests.
112 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at 761-62, 766, and (incorporating the contextual approach into the proportionality
analysis, stating that to apply the Royal College approach it is necessary to ask whether the expression prohibited
by the Criminal Code “is tenuously connected to the values underlying s.2(b)”, and concluding that hate
propaganda “contributes little” to the “quest for truth, the promotion of individual self-development or the
protection and fostering of a vibrant democracy”; following that analysis, restrictions on this “special category of
expression” are easier to justify). See Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 232.
113 See, e.g., Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (providing a full analysis, in the
majority and dissenting opinions, of the salutary benefits and deleterious consequences of a photo ID requirement
that violated the rights of members of a religious community).
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As explained, this approach facilitated a low-value designation for objectionable content
that provided a rationale for relaxing the standard of justification. That is how the Ford values resurfaced under s.1 as an unprincipled form of doctrinal leverage that could easily justify limits on
low-value expression.114 Anomalously, the contextual approach deployed values that are designed
to maximize the protection of expressive freedom for the opposite purpose of marginalizing
content and promoting justifiable limits. That deflection of s.2(b)’s underlying values – from
protecting freedom to justifying limits – is a betrayal of the Charter’s promise of expressive
freedom.
A declaration that expression is not valuable enough to warrant Charter protection is a
conclusion, not an evidence-based justification. In practice, the contextual approach’s assessment
of expressive value serves as a proxy when evidence of harm is unavailable or is equivocal. 115
Eliminating the contextual approach would mean that courts can no longer relax the standard of
justification when expressive content is deemed to be of low value. 116 Abandoning the contextual
approach would return to a methodology of limits that rests on an evidence-based conception of
harm. That approach rejects the logic that valueless and less valuable expression is harmful, or that
proof of harm is not required. Limits under s.1 must be based on evidence that expressive content
is sufficiently linked to demonstrable harm. At the point of considering limits and prohibitions on
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Prior to Keegstra, McLachlin J. began the process of developing Justice Wilson’s concept of a contextual
approach. In Rocket she recognized the importance of context in evaluating expressive activity under s.1 and used
this approach to evaluate the expression “in light of s.2(b) values”. Keegstra, supra note 112, at 760-61.
115 See generally E. Macfarlane, “Hate Speech, Harm, and Rights”, in Macfarlane, Dilemmas of Free Expression,
supra note 3, at 35-55.
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That raises a question – which is not answered here – whether issue-specific standards or some differentiation
of review for categories of expression (i.e., political, commercial etc.) should be adopted and whether that is a
function or breach under s.2(b) or justification under s.1 See Sethi, supra note 108.
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expression, the government must identify and define the harm at issue, then demonstrate that its
measures are carefully tailored to target expression that can permissibly be limited.
On this, the Supreme Court’s open court jurisprudence provides principled doctrinal
leadership. In a series of decisions, the Court developed a standard of justification, the
Dagenais/Mentuck test, that is highly protective of s.2(b).117 One of the key features of this
jurisprudence is the requirement that judicially imposed limits on open court rest on a “sufficient
evidentiary foundation”.118 This test and its requirement of an evidentiary basis led to a stricter
standard of justification on these issues than under Oakes. Seemingly unaware of a disconnect
between the two, the jurisprudence has not discussed, much less resolved, this double standard.119
Incorporating a requirement of evidentiary sufficiency into the Oakes analysis can harmonize these
branches of s.2(b) jurisprudence and ground an evidence-based approach to s.1 decision making
where expressive content is at issue.
In turn, a requirement of evidentiary sufficiency engages the concept of harm and the
threshold that must be met to justify limits. Defining harm and its threshold of democratic
tolerance – the point at which limits become permissible – is a complex task. At the least, it must
be clear that a finding of harm cannot rest on the low value of the content, or on unsubstantiated
notions of “common sense” and general knowledge (i.e., that hate speech is harmful).120 It does
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Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835; R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442 (establishing a
rigorous standard of justification for judge-made orders that would limit access to proceedings or place a ban on
publications). ). See J. Cameron, “Quixotic Journey”, supra note 5 (praising the open justice jurisprudence as a
“section 2(b) template”).
118 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (AG), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, at paras. 72, 73, 78 and 85 (reinforcing the requirement of a sufficient factual foundation for limits on open court).
119 While legislative restrictions on open justice are governed by Oakes, the Dagenais/Mentuck test applies to
judicial decision making and the discretion to close proceedings or impose a ban on publication.
120 See Macfarlane, “Hate Speech, Harm, and Rights” in Macfarlane, ed., Dilemmas, supra note 3 at 40-45
(discussing the question of empirically identifying harm).
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not suffice, for instance, that certain communities, or the community at large, perceive content to
be harmful.121 Moreover, the standard of a “reasoned apprehension of harm” must, at some
appreciable level of concreteness, state what the basis is for that apprehension.122
Setting a concept of harm into the foundation of methodology, in combination with a retreat
from the contextual approach, will ground the s.1 analysis in principle. Yet another difficulty with
a perceptive conception of harm is that it obviates the need for carefully defined restrictions on
expressive freedom. That creates an impermissible risk of regulation that is broad and inclusive,
rather than narrowly tailored to address an identifiable and substantiated risk of harm. Where
online content is concerned, the further concern is that expressive content can simply disappear
under various forms of take down rules, without due process or requirements of procedural
fairness.123
To the extent online communications are seemingly beyond regulation, out of control, and
in need of measures to prevent harm, the answer still cannot be found in crude mechanisms of
regulation. In making recommendations for a regulatory framework, the Report by the Canadian
Commission on Democratic Expression demonstrates that the details of online regulation are
immensely challenging.124 There, the Commission’s recommendations for addressing harmful
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See, e.g., Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, supra note 26 at paras. 132, 135 (stating that
a court can use “common sense and experience” in recognizing that activities such as hate speech inflict “societal
harms” and that the discriminatory effects of this speech are “part of the everyday knowledge and experience of
Canadians”).
122 The standard dates from R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 492, where pornography was found to have low value, and
has been applied in many other contexts, including high-value electoral expression: Harper v. Canada (AG), [2004]
1 S.C.R. 827, at paras. 77-78.
123 In this, takedown rules are in very broad and general terms the equivalent of the bygone era of postal, book,
and film censorship. See J. Cameron, “Process Matters: Postal Censorship, Your Ward News, and s.2(b) of the
Charter”, in Macfarlane, ed., Dilemmas , supra note 3 at 56-75 (arguing that s.2(b)’s guarantee of expressive
freedom must include process rights, including and especially when the government imposes a prior restraint on
the distribution or communication of expressive content).
124 “A Six-Step Program”, supra note 4.
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communications online proposed a regulatory framework comprising, among other things, a duty
to act responsibly, an e-tribunal, and a notice-and-notice process (for takedown).125 One of the
commissioners, Jameel Jaffir, endorsed the “broad outlines,” but did not join the Report because
the “harms reduction” model and recommendations provided no details or parameters about the
scope and details of regulation.126 In doing so, Jaffir flagged a critical issue going forward: that the
details of regulation directly engage the principle of freedom. More recently, the federal
government introduced Bill C-36 and has promised further measures to regulate social media and
online communication.127 These initiatives raise serious issues about procedural fairness under
s.2(b), as well as about the nature and scope of regulation.
These and other initiatives must be met by a renewed commitment to minimal impairment
that can guard against over-reaching in the regulation of expressive content. New forms of
regulation must comply with the Charter, including the rule of justification that an infringement
of the Charter must be carefully tailored to avoid collateral restrictions on constitutionally
protected activity. Re-invigorating the requirement that regulations must be minimally impairing
sends a signal to the legislatures that measures that do not meet constitutional standard must be
invalidated.
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See the Executive Summary, ibid., (outlining the Commission’s recommendations, which include a duty for
platforms to act responsibly, proposing a new regulatory body and social media council, and remedies for online
harm, which include A “quick” takedown system).
126 Ibid. at Annex B (explaining why he could not endorse the proposed “Duty to Act Responsibly” or the proposed
e-tribunals and notice-and-notice process).
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Supra note 4. See also A. Karadeglija, “The first 100 days: major battles over free speech, internet regulation
looms when Parliament returns”, October 10, 2021, National Post (explaining government plans to establish a
regulator and to require social media platforms to remove illegal content within 24 hours), online:
https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/the-first-100-days-major-battle-over-free-speech-internet-regulationlooms-when-parliament-returns
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Further adjustments are required to complete an overhaul of the methodology. As
suggested above, the contextual approach should be displaced by proportionality balancing, which
has matured in recent years. In revisiting this step, it is critical to refresh its purpose, which is to
enable the right or freedom to prevail against an infringement that is otherwise justifiable. By
definition, and because it only arises when a violation passes the other steps of the Oakes test, the
goal of final proportionality is rights protection: to determine whether the salutary benefits of
restrictions on expressive freedom outweigh its deleterious consequences for s.2(b)’s guarantee of
a fundamental freedom. This element of the justification analysis cannot be vitalized or re-vitalized
without addressing the “naked balancing” that typifies and problematizes this step. 128
A principled application of minimal impairment will minimize reliance on this element of
Oakes, but where it matters and could affect the outcome, proportionality balancing must place an
explicit onus on the government to demonstrate why the salutary benefits of the violation outweigh
the deleterious consequences for expressive freedom. Section 2(b)’s renewed approach to the
question of breach forms the backdrop of that discussion, ensuring that proportionality balancing
does not replicate or re-introduce the assumptions of the contextual approach and its disapproval
of low-value expression. Under this model, the deleterious consequences of the infringement are
directly juxtaposed with its salutary benefits, free from the a priori value judgments of the
contextual approach. In a renewed version of proportionality balancing, the deleterious
consequences of an infringement cannot be brushed off, but must be squarely and rigorously
addressed.
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Sethi, supra note 109 at 40. A more developed discussion of what this might look like is beyond the scope of this
article and its primary objective of proposing a prospectus for s.2(b) methodology.
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In practice, the proposed methodology will raise the threshold for limits under s.1, placing
the s.1 analysis in a framework of principle that is consistent with a robust conception of freedom
under s.2(b), and a burden of justification that falls on the state under s.1. There is sufficient
opportunity to justify limits on freedom under this framework because final proportionality enables
the analytical calculus of benefits and consequences to be calibrated. Regulatory interests can
prevail, even when set against the deleterious consequences for freedom, where the salutary
benefits of regulation are exigent and well established by the evidence.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Section 2(b)’s progress thus far has been mixed. The Charter’s guarantee of expressive
freedom has generated the most diverse and complex jurisprudence under s.2, including on matters
relating to the press and media, and has informed the outcome in cases where s.2(b) overlaps with
other s.2 guarantees, such as ss.2(a) and (d). Yet unlike other Charter guarantees, s.2(b)’s
conception of entitlement and Charter methodology has not been significantly refreshed or
renewed over the years, on the breach or justification sides of the analysis. 129 This is despite the
criticism this jurisprudence has attracted over the years.
A renewal of s.2(b) should not be piecemeal, but must instead embrace the very conception
of freedom that is protected by the guarantee, as well as the jurisprudential methodology of breach
and justification. This article offers a starting point and work in progress on that project. Still early
in its development, the proposal explains the goal, which is a principled foundation or conception
of expressive freedom, and the steps that must be taken to reset the current s.2(b) methodology.
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But see City of Toronto v. Ontario, 2021 SCC 34 (discussing Irwin Toy and the doctrinal framework that applies to
positive obligations under s.2(b) of the Charter).
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The model focuses symmetrically on questions of breach and justification because the problems
in the current methodology arise under s.2(b) and s.1.
The proposal turns the tables on the current jurisprudence and prioritizes the question of
breach, leaving a more detailed discussion of s.1 for a future article. Under s.2(b), developing a
principle of freedom, dropping the purpose-effects test, and replacing it with a new standard of
infringement are the first steps. Under s.1, abandoning the contextual approach and restoring an
evidence-based approach to decision making are the central objectives. The proposed framework
of renewal acknowledges that other issues must still be discussed. Central among them is the status
and wisdom of the assumption that the Oakes framework can serve as a monolithic standard for
diverse s.2(b) – and Charter – issues. The next step in this project is to turn the spotlight on s.1
and offer a more integral approach to the analysis of justification in s.2(b) cases.

